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in state-owned enterprises
Anna Menozzi*, Marı´a Gutie´rrez Urtiaga** and Davide Vannoni***,y
This article analyses the effects of board composition on the behavior of a sample
of 114 Italian local public utilities, for which information about 1630 directors
during 1994 2004 has been collected. This period is particularly interesting be
cause of the legal changes that forced many firms to alter their juridical form and
accommodated the entrance of private investors. We investigate whether board
size and/or board composition do affect decisions about employment and how
they ultimately impact performance. Our main findings indicate that politically
connected directors, who dominate boards of directors in Italian public utilities,
exert a positive and significant effect on employment, and have a negative impact
on performance.
JEL classification: G34, H42, H82, J45, K23, L25, L33, L97.
1. Introduction
Boards of directors play a central role in the governance of the enterprise. Directors
are in charge of monitoring the management, a duty that includes assessing the
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executives’ performance, determining the size of bonuses, and implementing incen-
tives to motivate managers to take actions consistent with the shareholders’ wealth
maximization. They also vote on important decisions such as mergers and acquisi-
tions, changes in the firm’s capital structure like stock repurchases or new debt
issues. In addition to their monitoring and disciplinary role, directors serve as an
important source of advice and counsel.
A growing body of empirical research suggests that the composition of corporate
boards influences shareholders’ value. “Inside directors” are commonly defined as
directors who are current employees of the firm. All the other directors are classified
as “outside directors”. Among outside directors, we first find “gray” or “affiliated”
outsiders, who are not currently employed by the firm, but are somehow connected
to the firm’s management or shareholders, that is because they are suppliers, cus-
tomers, consultants, relatives, or former employees. Therefore, the remaining cat-
egory, “independent directors”, only includes outside directors without any
connection past or present to the firm’s management or its shareholders.1
Although similar in their structure and functioning to the boards of directors of
private firms, the boards of directors of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) often do not
engage in the same activities. At best, SOEs’ boards may act as a kind of parliament
that represents the interests of employees, various ministries and, in some cases,
nonstate shareholders. In SOEs, state ownership and government control generate
problems that might contribute to poor performance. However, efforts to improve
corporate governance in SOEs have been weaker than in the private sector, where
changes have been extensive over the last two decades.
During the 1990s, the efforts to reform badly performing SOEs have been directed
towards promoting privatization waves. However, for both political and economic
reasons, the state will likely remain a major owner of productive assets in a number
of economies for years to come.2 Moreover, extensive experience with privatization
has also confirmed the important role that corporate governance can play before,
during, and after the state divests its assets.
Board composition is a highly studied topic as far as private firms are concerned,
but has received little attention in the context of SOEs. This is unfortunate, because
SOEs are more dependent on internal corporate governance mechanisms than
1However, it is very difficult to disentangle the category of “truly independent” directors. As pointed
out by Adams et al. (2010: 80): “Outside directors are often taken to be independent directors, yet the
independence of some directors who meet the definition of an outsider is questionable. Examples of such
directors are lawyers or bankers who do business with the company”.
2State owned enterprises remain prominent in air and rail transport, electricity, gas and water
supply, broadcasting, natural resource extraction, telecommunications, banking, and insurance.
Globally, in 2006, SOEs accounted for 20% of investment and 5% of employment (World Bank,
2006).
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private firms: unlike a widely held corporation in the private sector, a SOE generally
cannot have its board changed via a takeover and, most importantly, it is unlikely to
go bankrupt. The absence of potential takeovers and proxy contests reduce the in-
centives of board members and managers to maximize the value of the company,
and the impossibility of bankruptcy implies a soft budget constraint, which reduces
the pressure to contain costs. Hence, two of the most important external corporate
governance instruments that help to control underperformance are absent. Actually,
a SOE is widely held by the citizens, but it is generally overseen by higher political
bodies. These usually include one or more ministries, an ownership entity specifically
created to oversee SOEs, the Parliament or some combination of them. At worst,
these various authorities may use SOEs to achieve short-term political goals at the
cost of both efficiency and longer term policy objectives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994).
Even without evident abuse, this complex agency chain across various levels of gov-
ernment may involve difficulties that are not normally present in the relationship
between a company’s board and managers, on the one hand, and its shareholders, on
the other. SOEs also have the related problem of “common agency,” where each
relevant part of the government can try to exert its influence to pursue objectives that
might well be very different. Managing multiple and potentially conflicting objectives
is one of the central challenges in the governance of SOEs, as recognized by both the
World Bank and the OECD.3
In this article, we address the following research questions: Do board size and
composition matter in SOEs? For such firms, what is the impact of board charac-
teristics, and particularly of the presence of directors who are politicians, on prof-
itability and labor demand? What is the role of independent directors in SOEs? The
relationship between board composition and employment, on the one hand, and
board composition and performance, on the other, are investigated on a newly
hand-collected data set of 114 Italian public utilities, which are observed during
the period 1994–2004.
Similarly to what happened in the traditionally state-dominated sectors in many
OECD countries, a deep transformation of the institutional and industrial environ-
ment took place during the last decade in Italy. Industries dominated by utilities,
such as gas, water, electricity, and local public transportation underwent many le-
gislative changes. These changes were aimed at achieving the progressive separation
of public welfare considerations and policy functions from commercial ones. They
included the introduction of competition in the retail segment and the regulation of
access to market segments requiring significant investments through competitive
3“Fundamental problems in the governance of SOEs explain much of the poor performance of SOEs”
(World Bank, 2006: 3). “The boards of state owned enterprises should have the necessary authority,
competencies and objectivity to carry out their function of strategic guidance and monitoring of man
agement” (OECD, 2006: 17).
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tendering procedures. At the same time, government-controlled Italian public uti-
lities have gone through important transformations in their juridical form. The new
institutional designs for SOEs allow for the participation of private investors and for
the functional separation of operations from direction. From the initial status of
“Azienda Municipalizzata,”4 firms have sometimes evolved into a transitional jurid-
ical form called “Azienda Speciale” whose managers enjoy greater control over the
firm’s strategy. Nowadays, a large majority of Italian public utilities are limited
companies with a proper board of directors, in which both public and private entities
can invest, following a process-labeled corporatization. Such transformation is ex-
pected to improve the productive efficiency of the utilities, by giving them more
degrees of freedom in the choice of their input mix, in undertaking strategies of
horizontal or vertical integration and in enlarging the customer base.5 However, as
will be documented in the article, many politicians are (still) found to occupy key
positions in the boards of directors of Italian SOEs, and this might slow down the
necessary restructuring process of local public services.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review
the relevant literature dealing with board size, board compositions, and political
connections. In Section 3, we present the data set and the definition adopted for
identifying board composition. In Sections 4 and 5, we test the relevance of board
size and composition for firm-level employment and performance, respectively.
Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature review
Two strands of closely related literatures deal with the determinants and the effects of
board size and composition, on the one hand, and of the presence of politicians in
corporate boards, on the other hand.
2.1 The determinants and effects of board size and composition
The theoretical papers that are more closely related to our study are Raheja (2005)
and Harris and Raviv (2008). Raheja (2005) focuses on the role of outsiders, who
exert a monitoring activity, and insiders, who are better informed about the firm’s
constraints and opportunities. She argues that small-sized boards with few outsiders
are optimal for firms where the incentives of insiders are better aligned with those of
4This is an autonomous legal entity emanating de facto from the sovereign government, with a board
of directors (called “Commission”) which is directly nominated by the state owner.
5Moreover, since salaries should be set at levels equal to the ones prevailing in collective contracts in
the private sector (generally below the ones prevailing in the public sector), one should also expect
labour costs savings to occur.
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shareholders (such as in competitive industries or in the presence of a high degree of
insiders’ ownership). On the other hand, if the benefits of monitoring are expected to
be large, one should observe a higher proportion of outsiders. In a similar vein,
Harris and Raviv (2008) conclude that, under certain conditions, too many outsiders
could harm the firm value. In particular, the authors, by reinterpreting the board
inner conflict in terms of an agency problem between insiders and outsiders, prove
that profits and board size are endogenously determined variables. These insights
from the theoretical literature highlight the important problems one faces when
doing empirical work in this area.
To that respect, Adams et al. (2010), in their recent survey on the role of board of
directors in corporate governance, repeatedly stress the endogeneity issue:
Boards of directors are difficult institutions to study. The two questions
most asked about boards concern what determines their makeup, and
what determines their actions. These questions are, however, fundamen-
tally intertwined – the makeup of boards is interesting because it affects
what the board does; and, consequently, their makeup is influenced by a
desire to affect what they do. This problem of joint endogeneity is vexing
for both theoretical and empirical research on boards; research that
focuses on one side of the equation while ignoring the other is necessarily
incomplete and the results misleading. (Adams et al., 2010: 96–97).
Following this line of reasoning, in this article we will treat board size, board
composition, employment, and profits as endogenous variables. In doing so, board
composition will be defined in terms of outsiders as opposed to insiders, but the
differences among outside directors, concerning their independence and their polit-
ical background, will be taken into consideration too.
While there is a growing body of empirical works dealing with the above issues, at
present only a bunch of studies outside the United States are available. Moreover, the
focus is almost exclusively concentrated on the realm of private firms. Below, we will
report only a selection of recent empirical results that are closely related to our paper.
Extended surveys of the literature, such as Becht et al. (2003), Hermalin and
Weisbach (2003), Menozzi (2009), and Adams et al. (2010) are available for the
interested reader.6
Regarding the determinants of board size and composition, Linck et al. (2008),
using a sample of US firms over the 1990–2004 period, found that the observed
board structure was broadly consistent with the costs and benefits of boards’ moni-
toring and advising roles. Boone et al. (2007), concentrating on firms that went
public (IPOs), found that in the subsequent 10 years the restructuring of the
6See also Williamson (2007) for a discussion of the observed disparity between the efficacy of boards
as predicted by the theoretical literature and the actual practice of boards of directors, who find it
difficult to exercise their monitoring and advising roles.
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board was shaped by a mix of firm-specific and managerial characteristics, so as to
end up with a board structure well tailored to suit the firm’s specific competitive
environment.
Turning towards the effects of board size and composition, Yermack’s (1996)
seminal paper presented evidence of a negative effect of board size on performance,
a result which has been subsequently confirmed by many scholars. However,
Coles et al. (2008) found a U-shaped relationship between board size and perform-
ance. Following their interpretation, complex firms require a larger number of dir-
ectors (and of outsiders) as compared to simple firms, while R&D intensive firms
should better rely on inside directors. Klein (1998) also showed that there is not a
clear-cut relationship between performance and board composition. However, by
looking at the peculiar role covered by directors in committees (i.e. the nominating
committee, “monitoring” committees such as audit and compensation, as well
as “strategic” committees such as finance and investment), they found a positive
relationship between performance and the number of inside directors in these
committees.
2.2 The presence of politicians on boards of directors
A topic that has been increasingly investigated in recent times relates to the presence
of politicians on board of directors. Politically connected directors are explicitly
put into relation with firm performance by Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) and
Faccio (2006). Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) found that outsiders were having a
negative effect on the firm value. They interpreted this result by suggesting
that boards expanded for political reasons and this often resulted in too many out-
siders on the board. Politically experienced directors were found to be prevalent in
larger firms, where politics was more important, or in companies affected by the
political mechanism through government purchases, trade policy, environmental
regulation, and where lobbying was common. Faccio (2006), using a large sample
of 20,000 firms in 47 countries, showed that the corporate value increases after a top
officer (CEO, director, or a large shareholder) entered politics.7 In a similar vein,
Goldman et al. (2009), working on a sample of major US firms for the 1996–2000
period, provided support for the view that political connections add value to the
company.
As mentioned above, there are few papers that use non-US data. Cao et al. (2011)
showed for a sample of Chinese listed companies over the years 2002–2007 that
CEO’s political connection lowered the probability of CEO turnover, especially for
7In a subsequent paper (Faccio, 2010), she found that connected firms had higher leverage and were
paying lower taxes, but they were exhibiting also a poor accounting performance as compared to
their non connected counterparts. The author suggested that this latter result was probably due to
the ex ante low performance of firms prior to connection. Therefore, in her interpretation, political
connections were contributing to increase the value of poorly performing firms.
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badly performing firms, suggesting that political links could lead to undesirable
managerial entrenchment. Niessen and Ruenzi (2010) worked on a sample of 605
German public companies observed in 2006 and found that politically connected
firms provided better accounting and had better stock market performance. Bertrand
et al. (2004), using a unique data set of corporations listed on the Paris stock ex-
change over the 1992–2003 period, found that firms run by politically connected
CEOs were not over-performing their industries but they were slightly less profitable
than firms run by CEOs with a pure private sector background. Their interpret-
ation—i.e. that the politically connected CEOs were distorting the labor demand of
their firms to favor incumbents in upcoming political elections by creating more jobs
or by destroying fewer plants in politically contested areas—is particularly interesting
for the purpose of our work. By hiring more (or firing less) workers, firms had a
better access to subsidies and were allowed to pay lower local taxes, but the costs of
this management style was outweighing its benefits and the net effect on performance
turned out to be negative.
Overall, in spite of the fact that the results stemming from the above-mentioned
papers are not directly comparable,8 the bulk of the evidence points toward a positive
effect of political connectedness on firm’s value and performance. Our article con-
tributes to the above two strands of the literature by providing fresh evidence about
the effects of board size and composition on a sample of Italian local public (and
Government owned) utilities, where the political role of boards of directors is duly
taken into account. In doing so, we aim to fill a gap in the literature, since, to the best
of our knowledge, there is no available evidence on the above topics for Italy9 and for
state-owned firms.
Finally, given that our sample refers to firms which are “not yet privatized,” we
believe it is worth mentioning some recent evidence on newly privatized firms.
8Some papers use cross country data (Faccio, 2006, 2010), while other studies are focused on a
specific country. Some scholars look at the political connectedness of CEOs only (Bertrand et al.,
2004; Fan et al., 2007), rather than including all board members, while others consider the political
role of all the firm’s employees (Cingano and Pinotti, 2009). Sometimes a restrictive definition of
the political link (members of the Parliament or of the Government) is used, and directors which
have a seat on regional or municipal political bodies are not taken into account. Some authors look
at the directors’ past position as politicians, while others consider their actual political role. The
effects of board composition are evaluated according to different performance measures, such as
accounting based (ROA, ROE, and ROS) and stock based indexes (stock market prices and
market to book ratios), and so on.
9Cingano and Pinotti (2009) investigated the impact of political connections on performance for a
sample of 1200 Italian private firms observed over the period 1985 1997. Political connection
(measured by matching information on individuals appointed in local governments as mayors,
member of the local councils and of the executive cabinets with data on firms’ employees) was
found to be associated with a revenue premium, especially for upstream producers working for the
public administration, but had no impact on firm productivity. The results suggest the presence of a
welfare decreasing public demand shift toward politically connected firms.
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Boubakri et al. (2008) worked on a sample of 245 privatized firms observed in 41
countries over the period 1980–2002 and found a negative relationship between
accounting performance and political connectedness. In a similar vein, Fan et al.
(2007) analyzed 790 new partially privatized firms in China, showing that those with
politically connected CEOs were under-performing, in terms of post-privatization
earnings growth, sales growth, and change in returns on sales, their unconnected
peers.10 The above results are relevant for our analysis, since they suggest that at-
tempts to privatize, liberalize, and introduce more competition, such as the intro-
duction of reforms of the local public services in Italy, may be ineffective, delayed, or
partially neutralized by the choice of not removing (or of appointing new) politicians
in the board of directors.
3. Definitions and data description
Board composition is defined according to the political affiliation, the independence,
and the status as either insider or outsider of each director. Politically connected
directors may be identified by their present or past activity in the political arena,
as represented by a political appointment, the membership to a political party, and
the candidacy for election.11 As highlighted in the previous section, several defin-
itions of connectedness have been considered in the literature. Faccio (2006), for
example, defines directors as politically connected when they are members of par-
liament, heads of state, associated with or close to a political party or when their
relatives or close friends are. We consider as politically connected directors those
directors who are currently holding a seat in the parliament or in the municipal,
provincial, or regional government or held one in the past, and also, more gener-
ally, directors affiliated to a political party and those whose relationship with political
parties is well known. The reason for considering political connections at a lower
level than in Faccio (2006) is twofold: first, stakeholders of public utilities are
10In a recent contribution, Liao and Young (2011) found results which are partially against the
“political interference” hypothesis. Working on a sample of 514 privatized Chinese firms observed
for the period 1999 2004, they found that the Chinese government was utilizing two main channels
to keep its influence over privatized companies. Small firms and firms located in provinces with
lower competition were more likely to have government shareholders, while large companies and
firms active in regulated sectors were more likely to have politically connected CEOs in their boards.
Residual government ownership was found to exert a positive effect on Tobin’s Q, while politically
connected CEOs were found to impact positively on a “real sales” measure of postprivatization
performance.
11A director could be involved in the political arena even when none of the previous conditions is
met (e.g. through relatives). We do not include in our definition of political connection the dir
ector’s family or friends’ connection, because the limited territorial operational range of the sample
firms and their directors makes the information difficult to find and to verify.
?
generally located in a restricted geographic area, so that connections are important
at a very local level; second, our focus is on board components and their ob-
jective function so that we want to capture all possible sources of influence and
motivations.
We define as outside directors board members who are not current employees of
the firm. These may include the President of the board if he has no executive powers.
In public utilities, the President is generally a person of known experience and au-
thority or otherwise an honorary charge given to a civil servant as a recognition of his
past service.
Independent directors are identified by relying on the “Codice di autodisciplina”
issued by the Committee for corporate governance of listed firms of the Italian Stock
Exchange.12 Listed companies in the sample must say if their directors are independ-
ent or not according to the “Codice di autodisciplina” and sometimes nonlisted
companies do the same in their balance sheet or chart. We fill the missing informa-
tion for nonlisted companies by applying the same criterion to their directors.
3.1 Data set and summary statistics
The data set includes economic, technical, and governance variables of 114 Italian
public utilities surveyed annually in 1994–2004. The sample firms operate at local
and national level in the gas, electricity, and water production, distribution, and sale
to the final customer, and they are representative of their industries in terms of
number, geographical distribution, and size. Some of them are active in more than
one industry, i.e. they are “multi-utilities,” and 9 out of 114 are listed at the Italian
Stock Exchange. The dataset is unbalanced, with a total of 838 firm-year observations
and 1630 board directors.13
Information on governance was not included in the original data sets and its
collection makes this data set unique. It includes (i) the legal form, (ii) the biggest
three shareholders’ identity, (iii) the percentage of equity they own, (iv) the name of
the directors, (v) their position in the board, (vi) their political connection, if any,
and (vii) their position as insider, outsider, or independent directors as declared in
the firm chart or deducted from their role and curriculum. Companies with the
12The Code states: “A convenient proportion of non executive directors is represented by inde
pendent directors, who must not be involved in any economic relationship with the firm, its ex
ecutive directors and its shareholders, cannot execute control or relevant influence over the firm and
are not relatives of anyone in such a position” (p. 21).
13The unbalanced nature of the dataset is due to mergers or alienations, as a result of which some
firms disappeared and others entered at some specific point in time, as well as to the lack of the
primary source of information, i.e. the balance sheets. However, the data set is not strongly unba
lanced, and, most importantly for the validity of results, the missing values are randomly
distributed.
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“Azienda Municipalizzata” juridical form do not have a proper board of directors but
an “administrative commission” nominated by the local government who controls it,
and board composition is not always reported in their annual accounts. Despite these
difficulties, only 17 out of 838 board-year data, corresponding to the boards of six
different firms, are missing.
In order to identify politically connected directors, we proceeded by steps, by
addressing the sources of information from the least to the most sensitive. By putting
the information together, we were able to unravel the political connection of all the
1630 directors with a high degree of confidence.14
Table 1 summarizes some descriptive statistics for the profit ratios, the dimen-
sional variables, and board composition. ROI is computed as EBIT (earnings before
interest and tax expenses, equivalent to the operating profit), over capital invested (as
the sum of equity and financial debt), ROE is the proportion of net income over
equity, and ROA is EBIT over total assets. We also classify firms depending on the
type of its largest shareholder: Prblock is a dummy variable, which identifies private
blockholders, while public entities are divided between Lblock (equal to 1 for local
government) and Publock (equal to 1 for higher levels of government, like a prov-
ince, a region, a ministry or the central bank).
On average, boards are composed of less than seven directors, and sometimes all
of them are politicians. Outside directors are as common as politicians, but most of
them are not independent. The average number of directors per year is quite stable
over the sample period and shows a slightly increasing trend at the end of it. The
inflation in the number of directors could reflect the increase in the firms’ dimen-
sions over the period. This increase in firms’ dimension is linked to the transform-
ation into limited companies (Corp) and to the augmented operational capacity of
these firms. In 2004, there were no municipal firms (AzMun) left, while in 1994, at
the beginning of the sample period, they represented the majority of firms. The local
government (Publock) is the most popular type of blockholder, followed in turn by
private owners and by regional, provincial, and state organisms. Finally, the sample
includes many multiutilities, while, among the specialized firms, electric utilities fall
under the less numerous category.
14In principle, in Italy, political party membership and political appointments are public informa
tion. We contacted some Italian political parties and asked for the list of their affiliates but received
no help, for the declared reason that there is no available database with those records. We run the
biographical research on the electronic databases FACTIVA, LEXIS NEXIS, ABI Inform (press
release), and the Who’s Who in Italy. Even if directors in the list showed up in those databases,
there was almost no useful information about their political affiliation. We kept in touch with
ANSA, the most important press agency in Italy, who did not have the information either. Then, we
considered interviewing the board members and sent a meeting request to a small sample of 12
firms, selected from the biggest ones, but only four of them answered. This made us lay down the
idea to send questionnaires to the firms asking for their directors’ political connection. The last
resort was Internet, where we found most of the information.
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While Table 1 highlights the dominance of politicians on the boards, Table 2
shows that their incidence decreases as the number of independent directors goes up.
A positive correlation between board size and firm dimension is also found. The
incidence of politicians in the board is negatively correlated to the profit ratios and to
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Number of
observations
25% Median 75% Mean (SD)
ROI 838 0.021 0.050 0.090 0.069 (0.098)
ROE 838 0.007 0.037 0.091 0.065 (0.120)
ROA 838 0.013 0.033 0.056 0.037 (0.037)
Assets (’000 euro) 838 23,024 63,228 179,306 212,623 (476,818)
sales (’000 euro) 838 11,625 27,571 85,907 96,910 (221,688)
N 838 54 168 413 505.7 (1294.3)
Board 821 5 7 7 6.14 (2.48)
Polit 821 4 5 7 5.58 (2.49)
Indep 821 0 0 2 1.42 (2.10)
Out 821 4 6 6 5.13 (2.64)
Mean
Publock 19 0.023
Lblock 662 0.790
Prblock 157 0.187
Azmun 178 0.212
Azspec 221 0.264
Corp 439 0.524
Gas 139 0.166
Water 183 0.218
Electricity 58 0.069
Multiutilities 458 0.547
Note. ROI is the return on invested capital, ROE is the return on equity, ROA is the return on
assets, assets represents the firm total assets, N is the number of employees, sales is the rev
enues, board is the board size, indep is the number of independent directors, polit is the
number of politically connected directors, out is the number of outside directors. Publock is a
dummy variable for firms whose blockholder is a State entity at the highest level (ministry,
region, province, central bank, etc.), while Lblock identifies firms with local governments as
blockholders. Prblock is a dummy variable for firms whose blockholder is a private entity.
Azmun, Azspec, and Corp are dummies accounting for the juridical form (Azienda
Municipalizzata, Azienda Speciale, and limited company, respectively). Gas, water, and elec
tricity are dummies for firms focused mostly on one activity, while multiutilities identifies
diversified utilities who run several businesses.
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the size variables assets and N (total employment). On the contrary, the percentage
and the level of independent and outside directors are positively correlated with size.
In the following sections, we test these relations in a multivariate analysis.15
4. Firm-level employment and board of directors in the Italian
public utilities
The political view of SOEs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) has put forward the idea that
SOEs are over-staffed and that bureaucrats do not pursue any social objectives, and
are focused on reaching consensus. We test this hypothesis by investigating the
relationship between board dimension and composition, on the one hand, and the
number of firm’s employees, on the other. In firms controlled by a political body, as
in the case of Italian public utilities, employment might expand for political reasons.
The trend might be stronger if the board is dominated by politicians representing
various stakeholders and interests. In a profit-maximizing firm, independent direct-
ors would be expected to control those expansions of employment that are pursued
at the expense of profitability.
4.1 Board size and employment
The first hypothesis we want to test concerns the nature of the relationship between
board size and labor demand. The direct correlation between the two variables might
suggest a positive effect of board size on employment, which might nevertheless
include an indirect effect working through firm dimension. In order to control for
this potential indirect effect, we use an econometric technique known as “bounding
procedure” (Bond, 2002) to the estimation of the following model:
nit ¼ 1 nit 1 þ 1wit þ 2wit 1 þ 3 kit þ 4 kit 1 þ 5 boardit þ t þ i þ it ,
ð1Þ
where nit is the logarithm of employment in firm i at the end of corresponding year,
wit is the logarithm of average wage, kit is the logarithm of firm gross capital (as the
sum of total financial debt and equity), boardit is the number of directors sitting in
the board at time t, t is a time effect common to all firms, i is a permanent but
non-observable firm specific effect, and it is the error term. A theoretical inter-
pretation for (1), without the governance variable, is in Arellano and Bond (1991).
15Table 2 shows a very high correlation between politicians and outside directors. As suggested by an
anonymous referee, we have conducted our empirical analysis by relying only on the shares of
independent and politically connected directors, since including all the three proportions would
have been redundant and statistically not appropriate. We thank the referee for having construct
ively raised this issue.
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We apply different techniques to estimate the general expression in (1) and compare
the results in Table 3. The first specification is an OLS estimate (Column 1) in which
both the dependent variable nit and the explanatory variables are in levels. The year
1994 is lost due to the use of a lag. The dummy for the year 2004 is dropped because
the constant is included in the model. The problem in applying OLS is that the
lagged employment, nit1, is endogenous to the fixed effects in the error term, thus
violating the assumption necessary for the consistency of OLS and generating the
“dynamic panel bias.” As a consequence, the lagged employment’s coefficient (equal
to 0.954) is overestimated because it appropriates predictive power that actually
belongs to the firm’s fixed effect accounted for in the error term.
The first method to overcome the endogeneity problem is to transform each
variable in the corresponding deviation from the firm’s mean: OLS performed on
the transformed data is the within-group estimator and the regression generates fixed
effect estimates, as shown in Column (2) of Table 3. The lagged employment coef-
ficient falls from 0.954 to 0.763: this is the interval where the estimate of the true
parameter should fall. Unfortunately, the within-group transformation does not
remove the dynamic panel bias (Bond, 2002). An alternative method for addressing
both the endogeneity of regressors and the dynamic bias in a panel data is the
first-difference (FD) transformation, which eliminates the fixed effects and avoids
the propensity of the within-group transformation to make every observation of the
in-deviation-dependent variable endogenous to every other for a given individual. In
such a model, the dependent variable, the lagged dependent variable as a regressor,
and the other regressors are all transformed in first differences. While fixed effects are
removed (they are in fact differenced out), the lagged dependent variable is still
endogenous because it is correlated to the error term. At this point, the lagged
dependent variable in the first-difference model is endogenous, and instrumental
variables might help. Lags of the dependent variable of more than one period are
orthogonal to the error and are available as instruments. The same applies to all the
regressors that are not strictly endogenous. Instrumenting the dependent variable in
first difference with its level at time t 2 leaves the model exactly identified. This is
the intuition of Anderson and Hsiao (1981).16
While retaining the original Arellano–Bond moment conditions for the
in-difference equation, that is instrumenting variables in differences with variables
16We followed both the first difference (FD) and the Anderson Hsiao (1981) (AH) approaches, but
we do not report the estimates for reason of space. While the estimate of the AH employment model
is consistent, it is inefficient because it does not take into account all the possible orthogonality
conditions between deeper lags of the regressors and the error, nor the distribution of the error (in
difference). The coefficient of the lagged employment is 1.322 and falls outside the interval [0.763;
0.954] offered by the OLS and the within group estimates, thus signaling a poor performance of the
model. As a further check, by considering all valid lags of the untransformed variables as instru
ments, where available, one gets the classical “GMM diff” model (Arellano and Bond, 1991), for
which the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (0.182) does not fall in the valid range yet.
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in levels, Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest to “add” new conditions and to instru-
ment variables in levels with variables in differences: this creates the so-called
GMM-system estimate (GMM-sys). In practice, the model is treated as a system of
equations, one for each time period, where the predetermined and endogenous
variables in first differences are instrumented with suitable lags of their own levels;
the predetermined and endogenous variables in levels are instrumented with suitable
lags of their own first differences. Column (3) of Table 3 shows the result of the
one-step GMM-sys estimate. The coefficient of the lagged employment equals 0.821
and falls between the OLS and the within-group estimates. Unluckily, the Arellano–
Bond test for autocorrelation does not fail to reject the null hypothesis that the error
terms in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation at
Table 3 Employment and board dimension
Independent variables Dependent variable: nit .
(1) OLS (2) Within Group (3) GMM sys (4) GMM sys2
nit 1 0.954*** 0.763*** 0.821*** 0.826***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.061) (0.066)
wit 0.621*** 0.645*** 0.798*** 0.876***
(0.136) (0.136) (0.167) (0.141)
wit 1 0.576*** 0.459*** 0.611*** 0.626***
(0.089) (0.063) (0.093) (0.135)
kit 0.145*** 0.126*** 0.206*** 0.201**
(0.418) (0.038) (0.075) (0.091)
kit 1 0.105*** 0.086** 0.076 0.080
(0.035) (0.040) (0.053) (0.058)
boardit 0.000 0.018*** 0.033*** 0.030**
(0.003) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014)
AR(2) 1.70 1.64
AR(2) P value 0.088 0.101
Hansen Pr42 1.000 0.997
Hansen df 139 110
Difference Hansen Pr42 0.815 0.796
Number of observations 699 699 699 699
Time dummies Yes
Sample period 1994 2004
Number of firms 111
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses.
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10% significance level, while the Sargan–Hansen test fails to reject the null hypothesis
that all instruments are exogenous at the 5% level. Following Blundell and Bond
(1998), we treat kit and wit as endogenous and instrument them too when applying
the two-step GMM-sys estimator with correction for heteroskedasticity in Column
(4). The coefficient on lagged employment moves into the credible range delimited
by the pooled OLS and the within-group estimates and the model performs well.
The two-step GMM-sys estimates with correction for heteroskedasticity basically
confirm the first-step findings that the lagged employment and the contemporaneous
and lagged wage are the main determinants of the present employment.17 Given the
absence of second-order correlation in the first difference of the error term, the
two-step GMM-sys estimator may be relied on. The difference-in-Hansen test still
fails to reject the hypothesis that the additional moment conditions are valid.
Turning to our governance variable, the coefficient of boardit is found to be
positive and significant at the 5% level, highlighting a positive effect of board size
on the level of employment. However, it could well be the case that firms with large
headcount require dedicated policies and need expertise to be represented in the
board, so that board size could, in principle, depend on employment. Given that,
following Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and the discussion in Section 2, we have
treated board dimension as an endogenous variable, we can exclude such an inter-
pretation and be confident about the direction of causality.
4.2 Board composition and employment
Assuming that politically connected directors may be influential in deciding a public
utility’s employment, our next step is to directly test the impact of politicians (and of
independent directors) on labor demand. However, in order to compare the relative
effects of board size and composition, we should include both the characteristics of
directors and board dimension among the regressors, as well as other controls rep-
resenting company status and its change (AzMun, AzSpec, Corp, AzSpec, and
Corp) and the presence of a public blockholder (Publockit and Lblockit). We are
open to the possibility that the variables boardit, politit, %politit, and %indepit are
endogenous to the mechanism governing employment and we apply the bounding
procedure in analogy to what we did while dealing with board size. We, therefore,
estimate the model:
nit ¼ 1 nit 1 þ 1 wit þ 2 wit 1 þ 3 kit þ 4 kit 1 þ G Git þ t þ i þ it ,
ð2Þ
17All estimates are performed using the xtabond2 procedure in Stata developed by Roodman (2009).
In all cases, the two step estimates are reported with the finite sample correction of the variance
covariance matrix suggested by Windmeijer (2005). We tried also two lags for employment and the
capital stock, and we included also aggregate output per sector among the regressors. Results are
available upon request.
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where nit, wit, kit, nit-1, wit-1, kit-1, t, i, it are defined as in (1), and Git is a vector of
governance variables, such as the juridical form, the presence of blockholders, and
board dimension or composition.
The first column of Table 4 shows that, while adding further controls does not
improve significantly the explanatory power of our baseline model, the results on the
impact of board size are indeed robust to such an inclusion.18 Most importantly,
Column 3 shows that politically connected directors exert a positive and significant
impact on the level of employment. The results are in line with our hypothesis on the
influence of politicians over employment levels, and are also an important confirm-
ation of a stylized fact about the behavior of state-owned firms, traditionally
over-employed, as argued by Boycko et al. (1996).
In firms with dispersed, private ownership, the presence of independent and
outside directors is considered as a signal of strong governance because of the moni-
toring that these directors are expected to exert over the managers. NYSE (since
1978) and the NASDAQ (since 1989) require companies whose stocks are traded on
their exchanges to have at least two outside directors on their corporate boards. This
requirement suggests that some unaffiliated monitoring is considered necessary to
safeguard or advance shareholders’ interests. According to the Italian “Codice di
Autodisciplina” for listed companies, outside directors should have a substantial in-
fluence over board decisions by virtue of their number and authority. Their opinion
is particularly important when the executives’ interests are not aligned with the
shareholders’, for they are external to the firm’s daily management. In firms with
concentrated ownership, some directors should be independent from the bloc-
kholder, in order to guarantee the autonomy of the board from the controlling
shareholders. Even in the case of state ownership, which is pervasive in our
sample of Italian public utilities, the transformation from municipal firms into spe-
cial firms, first, and into limited companies afterward, has given outside board
members an increasing power, at least nominally. The fourth column in Table 4
shows that the percentage of politicians (%politit) has a positive impact on employ-
ment, while a negative sign is found for the percentage of independent directors
(%indepit). While this is in accordance with a priori expectations, the coefficients of
the two variables fail to reach an acceptable level of significance. Furthermore, by
looking at the results in Column 5, we can observe that the coefficient on board size
is robust to the inclusion of variables accounting for board composition. We can,
18The vector Git in Column 2 includes also AzSpecit and Corpit, two variables accounting for the
number of years elapsed since the firm has changed its form (from the municipal into the special
form and from special firms into limited companies, respectively). Overall, the results show that the
juridical status and its change do not have any discernible impact of labor demand. Conversely, as
will be documented in Section 5.1, our findings show that the corporatization process has a positive
effect on the accounting performance of local public utilities.
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Table 4 Employment, board size and composition: politicians and independent directors
Independent variables Dependent variable: nit .
nit 1 0.809*** 0.806*** 0.817*** 0.620*** 0.625***
(0.069) (0.070) (0.065) (0.067) (0.066)
wit 0.872*** 0.856*** 0.919*** 0.713*** 0.713***
(0.187) (0.187) (0.168) (0.187) (0.196)
wit 1 0.638*** 0.630*** 0.616*** 0.426*** 0.453***
(0.098) (0.089) (0.103) (0.122) (0.112)
kit 0.178** 0.200** 0.159** 0.272*** 0.288***
(0.081) (0.100) (0.069) (0.063) (0.068)
kit 1 0.062 0.077 0.060 0.044 0.024
(0.049) (0.063) (0.047) (0.034) (0.033)
AzMunit 0.066 0.052 0.065 0.101 0.137
(0.047) (0.041) (0.044) (0.072) (0.083)
AzSpecit 0.043 0.001 0.048 0.092 0.064
(0.035) (0.041) (0.032) (0.062) (0.052)
Publockit 0.016 0.030 0.041 0.326 0.299
(0.201) (0.190) (0.166) (0.394) (0.319)
AzSpecit 0.013
(0.012)
Corpit 0.012
(0.010)
Lblockit 0.050 0.038 0.068* 0.009 0.005
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.101) (0.072)
boardit 0.026** 0.019* 0.019*
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
politit 0.019**
(0.009)
%politit 0.410 0.298
(0.328) (0.255)
%indepit 0.187 0.219
(0.191) (0.160)
AR(2) 1.57 1.59 1.58 1.53 1.57
AR(2) P value 0.117 0.112 0.115 0.115 0.116
Hansen Pr42 0.999 0.993 0.995 1.000 1.000
Hansen df 110 110 129 255 286
Difference Hansen Pr42 0.695 0.303 0.386 1.000 1.000
Number of observations 699 699 699 699 699
Time dummies Yes
Sample period 1994 2004
Number of firms 111
Estimated models: GMM sys2. ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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therefore, conclude from this first set of regressions that board size shows to be more
important than board composition in explaining the labor demand of Italian public
utilities.
5. Board size and composition and firm performance
We, now, turn to the main focus of the paper, by asking the following question: Do
board dimension and composition affect the firm value in state-owned local public
utilities? The question is relevant in itself, but it is particularly poignant if applied to
the Italian institutional context. The progressive corporatization of public utilities,
that is the transformation from the “Azienda Municipalizzata” into the “Societa` per
azioni” juridical form, has put the bases for their strategic independence and signaled
the legislator’s intention to make firms autonomous in their investment plans and
financing capacity. Moreover, the expected profitability of state-controlled firms is
essential in order to stimulate private investors to be part of the ownership structure.
The corporate finance literature usually explains the relationship between govern-
ance and profitability by means of a dynamic linear model in which one or more lags
of the dependent variable (stock return or accounting index) are used as regressor, as
in the seminal work by Yermack (1996). Differently from employment level, which is
a stock variable accumulated over time, profitability is usually measured by flows,
such as stock price or profit ratios. We, therefore, study the effect of board dimension
and composition on the operating performance of Italian public utilities by estimat-
ing the following static linear model:
yit ¼ G Git þ X Xit þ t þ i þ it , ð3Þ
where yit is a performance indicator, Git is a vector of governance variables, such as
the juridical form, board dimension, or composition, Xit is a vector of control vari-
ables, such as sector or firm dimension, t is a time dummy, i is an individual, time
invariant variable, and it is the error term. Only 10 out of 114 firms in our sample
are listed, so that the firm performance will be assessed by accounting measures,
namely ROI and ROE.19
5.1 Board size and performance
We estimate the following model:
yit ¼ 1 boardit þ XXit þ t þ i þ it , ð3:1Þ
19ROA has been excluded as a dependent variable for two reasons: first, ROA is quite stable during
the sample period and across firms, so it gives little information about differences among the sample
units; second, most Italian firms finance their total assets more through accounting payables than
with financial debt, so that ROA does not properly reflect the capital profitability, which is our main
concern.
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with two-step GMM-sys estimators, where yit is the ROI or ROE, boardit is the
number of directors at time t and Xit represents a set of control variables (such as
firm dimension and the industrial sector) that we alternatively use in order to check
the robustness of our results. Employment and total assets, in levels or logarithm, are
popular measures for firm size, and we try them all. We also separate the firms into
three groups, small, medium and big, including companies whose total assets are
below the 33th percentile, between the 33th and the 66th percentile, and above the
66th percentile, respectively. We consider the governance variable boardit as en-
dogenous, consistently with the previous analysis on employment. Table 5 presents
the results, with ROI and ROE as dependent variables, and dummies for small- and
medium-sized firms included as regressors.20
We confirm for Italian public utilities the results that Yermack (1996) finds for
US, listed, private firms with dispersed ownership: board dimension is negatively
correlated with profitability. In short, bigger boards seem to pursue higher head-
count at the expense of economic value. The result is evident across industries and is
purged of any possible size effect. Firms in the gas (water) industry show a tendency
to a higher (lower) ROI (ROE). Since the omitted category identifies multi-utility
firms, we do not find a clear indication that utilities which operate in more than one
sector are performing differently from operators specialized in water, gas, and elec-
tricity, respectively.21
Table 6 shows the results of regressions in which model 3.1 has been enriched by
including variables accounting for the company’s juridical form, that is AzMunit,
which identifies municipal firms, and AzSpecit, which identifies special firms (the
omitted category being the limited corporation form Corpit), as well as for the pres-
ence of a blockholder. The negative signs for Publockit and Lblockit suggest that the
presence of private blockholders (the omitted category) is effective in spurring effi-
ciency in Italian SOEs. “Mixed firms”, that is companies participated by both state
and private investors, are one example of public–private partnership, typically used
in the reorganization of local public services, mostly when the creation and the
management of integrated public services are concerned. Public–private partnerships
may help the public sector to make resources available for alternative investments but
it is not clear whether the most productive investments would be financed through
these agreements (Hart et al., 1997; Hart, 2003). In a similar vein, the negative signs
for both AzMunit and AzSpecit highlight the idea that corporatization is associated
with higher performance, a result in line with the evidence provided by Cambini
et al. (2011), who investigated the effects of corporatization on the costs of a sample
20The results of regressions in which total assets and number of employees are used as size variables
are virtually unchanged.
21See Piacenza and Vannoni (2004), for a detailed analysis of the cost function of Italian multi
utilities, in which some evidence of the presence of scope economies is provided.
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of Italian local public transport companies. The longitudinal dimension of our
dataset allows us to investigate in more detail the performance effects of the
change of the juridical form. Column 4 includes two time varying regressors
(AzSpecit and Corpit), accounting for the number of years elapsed since the
firm has changed its form (from the municipal into the special form and from special
firms into limited companies, respectively). The coefficient on Corpit is positive
and strongly significant, suggesting that the transformation into limited companies is
bringing performance improvements that increase through time. The model esti-
mated in the last column, which simultaneously includes variables accounting for the
Table 5 Governance and economic performance: ROI and ROE
Independent variables Dependent variables
ROI ROE
boardit 0.006** 0.004* 0.006** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
smallit 0.035** 0.026
(0.016) (0.017)
mediumit 0.002 0.015
(0.008) (0.011)
waterit 0.028 0.024 0.044*** 0.045***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014)
gasit 0.054* 0.049* 0.038 0.029
(0.029) (0.029) (0.035) (0.031)
electrit 0.007 0.013 0.004 0.001
(0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.023)
constant 0.115*** 0.100*** 0.116*** 0.114***
(0.024) (0.021) (0.025) (0.027)
AR(2) 0.13 0.09 1.30 1.15
AR(2) P value 0.894 0.927 0.195 0.250
Hansen Pr42 0.301 0.507 0.936 0.908
Hansen df 64 64 53 53
Difference Hansen Pr42 0.517 0.339 0.902 0.820
Number of observations 821 821 821 821
Time dummies Yes
Sample period 1994 2004
Number of firms 113
Estimated models: GMM sys2. ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 6 Performance, juridical form and blockholders
Independent variables Dependent Variable: ROI
boardit 0.006* 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
smallit 0.026 0.029* 0.039** 0.041** 0.038**
(0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
mediumit 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.006
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
AzMunit 0.037* 0.014 0.010
(0.020) (0.012) (0.014)
AzSpecit 0.045*** 0.021*** 0.004
(0.015) (0.008) (0.012)
AzSpecit 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Corpit 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003)
Publockit 0.069* 0.068* 0.058* 0.058**
(0.041) (0.039) (0.029) (0.028)
Lblockit 0.067*** 0.059*** 0.049*** 0.047***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
waterit 0.027** 0.030** 0.032** 0.033** 0.031**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
gasit 0.033 0.019 0.015 0.013 0.011
(0.027) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023)
electrit 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006
(0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Constant 0.108*** 0.152*** 0.142*** 0.067** 0.066**
(0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029)
AR(2) 0.30 0.05 0.14 0.04 0.05
AR(2) P value 0.761 0.964 0.892 0.965 0.960
Hansen Pr42 0.761 0.783 0.767 0.526 0.546
Hansen df 53 54 64 64 64
Difference Hansen Pr42 0.854 0.667 0.643 0.281 0.317
Number of observations 821 821 821 821 821
Time dummies Yes
Sample period 1994 2004
Number of firms 113
Estimated models: GMM sys2. ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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actual juridical form and for the change in status, confirms that ROI increases in the
years following corporatization.22
Overall, the results reported in Table 6 seem to indicate that in Italian public
utilities the presence of a private investor counterbalances the negative effect on
profitability produced by the inflation of board size or the persistence of traditional
juridical forms.23
5.2 Board composition and performance
We follow the same approach as for employment and study the relationship between
the number and the percentage of politicians, as well as the proportion of independ-
ent directors sitting on the board and firm profitability, by including politit, %politit
and %indepit as (endogenous) right-hand side variables. We report in Table 7 the
estimates for ROI, but the results are confirmed also by looking at ROE. Differently
from what happens when employment is taken as the dependent variable, the
number of politicians sitting on the board is found to have a negative impact on
profitability. Politically connected directors seem to concentrate on increasing the
headcount more than paying attention to the economic performance. By including
both, the board size and board composition variables simultaneously, we confirm the
negative effect of politicians sitting on the board on performance (%politit).
Interestingly, the coefficient on boardit looses it significance, thus suggesting that
board composition is more important than board size in influencing firm perform-
ance. While the coefficient on %indepit is never significant, its negative sign seems to
reinforce the idea that the objective of independent directors is not quite what one
would expect from their profile: they seem to mimic the politicians in favoring more
employment at the expense of profitability.24
Garrone et al. (2010) estimated a cost function on a sample of 27 Italian muni-
cipal utilities observed over the period 1997–2006. A variable accounting for the
22When AzSpecit and Corpit are included as simple dummies (i.e. they do not increase across
time), the corresponding coefficients are not significantly different from zero, thereby confirming
that it takes some time before the change in status starts to produce its effects. We are indebted to an
anonymous referee for suggesting to us this line of investigation.
23It is not surprising that the inclusion of the dummies for blockholders reduces the significance of
the coefficient on board size, given that the presence of a well identified blockholder can be effective
in reducing the agency problems discussed in the introductory session.
24This might be due to the fact that directors’ independence, as declared by the firm chart, is
perhaps disconnected from what emerges from their biography: some directors, whom we have
recognized as politically connected to the blockholder without being public officers (thus not pol
iticians in a strict sense), are said to be independent, but they may actually pursue the same
objectives as politicians. If this is the case, the status of independent is not very informative and
the interpretation of the econometric results becomes quite difficult.
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percentage of outside directors (who were considered as an undifferentiated cat-
egory) on the board was not found to have any relevant effect on cost efficiency.
Coupling this evidence with our findings on the regressors %politit and %indepit, we
believe that empirical studies should be conducted at a much finer-grained level in
the future. To that respect, looking inside the black box of the board of directors
appears to be a promising area of research.
6. Conclusions
Despite the evolution of the legal and industrial framework, Italian public utilities are
still controlled by state entities and their boards are dominated by politicians to a
large extent. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) explain that political control of firms (as
brought by a politically dominated board) leads to a less efficient resource allocation
than managerial control. Government-owned firms are thought to forgo profit
Table 7. Performance, board size and composition: politicians and independent directors
Independent variables Dependent variable: ROI
boardit 0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
politit 0.004*
(0.002)
%politit 0.086* 0.095**
(0.051) (0.056)
%indepit 0.034 0.012
(0.034) (0.038)
AR(2) 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.08
AR(2) P value 0.892 0.895 0.914 0.933
Hansen Pr42 0.767 0.261 0.933 0.991
Hansen df 64 58 76 126
Difference Hansen Pr42 0.643 0.118 0.380 1.000
Number of observations 821 821 821 821
Time dummies Yes
Sample period 1994 2004
Number of firms 113
Estimated models: GMM sys2. Coefficients on smallit, mediumit, waterit, gasit, electrit,
Azmunit, AzSpecit, Pblockit, and Lblockit not reported.
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses.
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maximization in the search for social and political objectives such as wealth distri-
bution and employment.
This paper addresses this open question by means of a newly hand-collected sam-
ple of 114 Italian public utilities observed during the period 1994–2004. The analysis
on profitability and employment suggests that board size and composition matter
even in state-owned firms with concentrated ownership and public blockholders.
We find that both, board size and the presence of politically connected directors
have an inflationary effect on employment. These results confirm the general opinion
that state-owned firms are over-employed and employment maximizing. Our evi-
dence suggests that, in state-owned firms, big boards might suffer from coordination
problems, just like the boards of privately held firms, as confirmed by Yermack
(1996).
Interestingly, board size is found to be more important than board composition
in increasing the number of employees. However, when we turn our attention to
performance, we find that board composition—namely, the number and proportion
of politicians sitting on the board—turns out to have a more important and negative
effect on the accounting performance of Italian SOEs.
Finally, we also find that the position of independent directors is ambiguous, in
that they seem to imitate politicians by negatively affecting the firm value. According
to the existing theoretical literature, outside directors are often treated as an undif-
ferentiated group opposed to insiders. By distinguishing between outsiders who are
politically connected and outsiders who declared themselves as independent, we can
investigate the objectives pursued by different types of outside directors within the
board. Our evidence suggests that, beyond their status, independent directors might
hide an indirect affiliation to politicians or even aim to the same objectives without
necessarily enjoying any political connection.
The results of the article are in line with the ones obtained by Bertrand et al.
(2004) for private firms active in politically contested areas and by Boubakri et al.
(2008) and Fan et al. (2008) for newly privatized firms. In both cases, political
connections are found to harm firm performance. Thus, we conclude that, when
privatization does not remove politicians from boards of directors, these directors
can seriously undermine the goals of privatization. Favoring strong political connec-
tions in state-owned local public utilities can well annihilate the positive effects that
the reforms of the sector (i.e. corporatization processes or any attempts to introduce
competition) are expected to bring. Indeed, our findings show that the effect of the
percentage of politicians in the board is robust to the inclusion of variables account-
ing for the juridical status, the change in juridical form, and the presence of private
investors.
From a policy perspective, our results are in line with the regulation, which has
been recently imposed to most Italian local public utilities by Law 6/8/2008, n. 133
and which is going to be implemented by means of accomplishing decrees. Together
with the promotion of more competition through privatization and the introduction
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of tendering procedures, this law attempts to separate the regulator from the man-
agement of the regulated firm, by foreseeing bans for mayors, members of the mu-
nicipal councils and of executive cabinets, and any other civil servant working at
present or in the past 3 years at the municipality, to sit on the boards of directors of
the corresponding local public utilities.
Leaving political connectedness aside, the results of the paper also suggest that a
larger number of directors might indicate the presence of different types of stake-
holders, such as creditors or consumers, who may have a potential interest in pursu-
ing their own strategies. Disagreement among directors may increase employee
power vis a vis the managers and could be detrimental for profitability. The limits
recently imposed by the Italian Budget Law (Law 27/12/2006, n. 296) to the total
number of directors, in the case of full public ownership (three to five, depending on
firm size), or to the number of directors that can be nominated by the local muni-
cipality, in the case of mixed ownership (no more than five) might be consistent with
this view and are, therefore, particularly welcome.
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